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This paper aims to identify the macroeconomic determinants of sovereign bond 
spreads in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico and discusses the economic policies 
underlying the divergent fortunes experienced by these countries over 1993-2001. 
Those determinants, namely real GDP growth, gross capital inflows and debt 
service burden (as a percentage of GDP), are derived from a consistent theoretical 
framework and empirically tested. The econometric analysis suggests that a 
permanent change in these determinants has a more significant and robust impact 
on spreads than transitory shocks. It also points out that financial contagion or 
risk-aversion variables have a meaningful role in explaining sovereign spreads 
across Latin American countries.
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1.  introduction And MotivAtion
“Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent” —J. M. Keynes
What are the determinants of sovereign bond spreads? What theory can 
make sense of bond spreads dynamics in a general equilibrium framework? More 
specifically, which variables have influenced sovereign bond spreads in Latin 
∗ I would like to thank Marcel Peter, Demian Panigo, Thomas Weithöner, Richard Portes and one 
anonymous referee for very helpful and enriching comments on the results obtained in this paper. I 
also wish to acknowledge Jorge Braga de Macedo, Daniel Cohen, Ulrich Hiemenz, Helmut Reisen, 
Javier Santiso, and participants of oECD Development Centre, DELTA, The American University 
of Paris, Banco de España, LACEA, University d’EVRy and T2M seminars for valuable comments 
to an earlier version.
Email: martin.grandes@aup.edu52 cuAdernos de econoMíA Vol. 44 (Noviembre) 2007
American countries? How statistically and economically important are fundamen-
tals as opposed to contagion effects, global risk aversion or international risk-free 
interest rate volatility? How relevant is a permanent variation against a transitory 
change in those fundamentals? What policy implications can be derived from the 
theoretical and empirical analysis of Latin American sovereign bond spreads?
This paper seeks to address these questions drawing on the theoretical 
framework in Kharas (984) and using three major Latin American emerging 
countries in 993-200 as a case study: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. These 
economies have clearly driven emerging market spreads on a global scale over 
the period 993-200, i.e. the period following the Brady Plan which restructured 
and securitized the defaulted banking loans undertaken by multiple developing 
countries in the 970s and 980s, thereby providing for secondary market liquidity 
in emerging bond markets.
According to JP Morgan, Latin American sovereign bonds weighed 7% 
and 60% in the benchmark indexes EMBI+ and Euro EMBI Global, respectively 
(IMF, 200). Furthermore, public and private bonds issued by Latin American 
countries between 993 and 200 amounted to half of the emerging sovereign debt 
issued over the same period (Table  below). Indeed, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
represented a substantial fraction of the emerging bond market and drove this 
market until Argentina defaulted on the bulk of its sovereign debt in early 2002.
TABLE 










Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico others
(%)* (%)* (%)* (%)* (%)*
Dec-93 07.4 4. 38 7.3 20.9 .9 46.5 3.4
Mar-0 450.7 224 50 29.5 24.8 3.2 29.6 2.9
Source:  Bank of International Settlements (200).
* Share of Latin America & Caribbean totals.
Figure  exhibits the JP Morgan EMBI + sovereign spread indexes for 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, spanning January 994-December 200 
(January 997-December 200 in Chile). Chile is used as a regional benchmark, 
for it has always been the most creditworthy country in the region (A- or A 
ratings according to Standard and Poor’s). The EMBI + sovereign spreads display 
a high degree of comovement and similar average levels –with the exception of 
Chile– through August 998, a considerable decoupling of Mexico from then 
onwards, and the maintenance of very tight and lowly correlated spreads on 
Chilean sovereign bonds throughout. Brazilian spreads stay highly correlated and 
 In this paper, the terms “sovereign spreads”, “sovereign bond yield spreads”, “country risk”, “sovereign 
default risk” and “sovereign credit risk” are used interchangeably. Strictly speaking, sovereign spreads 
or credit spreads more generally can be decomposed into the expected loss given default (default risk) 
plus a risk premium attributable to unexpected losses in case of default (risk aversion).the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 53
at relatively large levels after the Asian cum Russian financial crises partly due 
to the fallout of its currency devaluation in January 999 and the ex-ante market 
perception of investors that a default in Argentina could disrupt the debt servicing 
of Brazilian bonds (which with hindsight never occurred).
In this paper we aim to figure out why sovereign spreads in these Latin 
American countries widen, narrow or comove to the extent they do over the period 
993-200 i.e., prior to the Argentinian default of 2002.
The study covers this period because it is one of good availability of com-
parable and reliable sovereign bond spread data2. More specifically, we want to 
shed light on those similar or differentiated performances across countries reported 
2 The Argentinian default in 2002 and the fact that it is only in April 2005 when 76% of the defaulted 
debt (domestic and foreign) is restructured and swapped for new debt, hence traded at “normal prices”, 
makes the comparative analysis unfeasible in 2002-2005. In addition, after 2002 the EMBI (basically 
made up of Brady bonds) and EMBI + indexes became less representative of emerging market asset 
class. This phenomenon owes to at least two reasons. First, some countries have retired or bought back 
their Brady bonds. Second, many countries have started to issue increasingly more domestic debt in their 
own currency rather than dollar-denominated bonds issued globally (see The Economist, 2007).
FIGURE 
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in Figure  by putting forward a model which accounts for sovereign spreads in a 
dynamic equilibrium framework and which is econometrically testable on a time 
series dimension.
our contribution to the literature3 is manifold. First, unlike the bulk of the 
literature which relies on “kitchen-sink” equations of the spread function4 we 
derive the sovereign spread equation from a consistent and testable theoretical 
framework. Second, this paper is, to our knowledge, the first to introduce the 
breakdown between permanent and transitory changes in the fundamental vari-
ables which account for sovereign spreads. While these fundamental variables are 
drawn from the theory, potentially omitted variables such as contagion effects, 
global risk aversion (appetite for risk or risk premia), or international risk-free 
interest rate volatility are controlled for. Third, we offer some policy analysis 
with insights into extremely different experiences in terms of sovereign spreads 
performance (Argentina and Brazil on the one side, and Mexico on the other). 
Fourth, we provide a larger sample (9 years, monthly data) than in most existing 
regional studies, covering all financial crises episodes occurred over the corre-
sponding period (993-200).
The paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the literature on 
the determinants of sovereign bond spreads. Section three presents and discusses 
a model of a small, open economy with real variables intended to derive the de-
terminants of sovereign risk in a dynamic equilibrium framework. Section four 
describes the data set and show how the explanatory variables behave over the 
relevant period. Section 5 introduces the econometric methodology and estima-
tion output. Finally, some concluding remarks are put forward, with a view to a 
policy discussion.
2.  literAture review
In this section we survey the literature on the empirical determinants of 
sovereign spreads. The latter can be decomposed into the expected loss given 
default (default risk) plus a risk premium attributable to unexpected losses in 
case of default (risk aversion). Sovereign bond spreads is one but not the only 
way of measuring and quantifying sovereign default risk. other measures include 
the “distance to default” (information implicit in bond prices), sovereign credit 
ratings and institutional investor rankings of the sovereign creditworthiness. our 
literature review focuses on bond spreads, stressing the samples covered in each 
study, the econometric methodologies adopted therein (cross-section, pooled data, 
and time series multi-country or single-country studies) and the major findings 
in terms of the relevance of fundamentals versus market sentiment (global risk 
3 For a survey of the literature see section 2.
4 Exceptions are, Edwards (986), Ferrucci (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004) –who work on a panel of 
European Union countries– or Gonzalez Rozada and Levy-yeyati, 2006.the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 55
aversion), variability in US Treasury bond rates, and other external shocks (e.g. 
contagion episodes amid financial crises). Whenever possible, we emphasize the 
specifics of the literature on Latin America.
In a landmark contribution, Edwards (986) performs two econometric exer-
cises. First, he estimates the determinants of bond spreads for a group of emerging 
countries (including Latin America) using a panel of primary bond yield spreads 
spanning 976-980 and fixed effects to reflect the date of issuance. He finds that 
the debt to GNP ratio affects positively bond spreads, while an increase in gross 
investment to GNP, debt service to exports (against expectations), and maturity 
reduce sovereign bond spreads. Second, he runs a model of the Mexican second-
ary market bond yield spreads over 976-984. Basically, he concludes that the 
debt to exports ratio, the real effective exchange rate, and the oil price (the latter 
against expectations) are all positively and statistically significantly correlated to 
spreads, while Reserves to Imports and the manufactures production growth rate 
enter significantly but negatively correlated to sovereign risk. Neither regression 
controls for global risk aversion nor for shocks to United State Treasury bond 
rates (USTB) at either end of the curve –a time specific fixed effect is assumed 
to capture the latter in the pooled regression. Besides, Edwards does not break 
down the variation in fundamental variables (debt ratios, real exchange rate, etc.) 
into permanent and transitory changes.
Min (998) looks at primary market bond spreads on a number of public and 
private issuances in emerging markets over the period 99-995. After controlling 
for issuer differences (private or public) and structural shifts (e.g. the Mexican 
crisis), he reports a positive and significant effect of debt to GDP, debt service to 
exports, net foreign assets, exports growth, the real exchange rate, and inflation 
on one side, and negative effects of the terms of trade, foreign exchange reserves 
to GDP, maturity and imports growth on sovereign spreads, on the other. The 
0-year US Treasury bond rate and the oil price do not yield statistically significant 
coefficients. Min does not control for a measure of global risk aversion and does 
not take into account the breakdown of fundamental variables (current account, 
real exchange rate, inflation, etc) into permanent and transitory components.
Exploiting a larger database gathering corporate and sovereign emerging 
bond issues, Eichengreen and Mody (998) conduct a study on the determinants 
of primary bond market spreads in 99-996, either in levels or first differences. 
They split up the sample and run regressions across several regions considering 
different levels of aggregation (Asia and Latin America, Asia alone, Eastern Europe 
and so on). Besides confirming that a higher ratio of debt service to exports is 
associated with higher bond spreads5, Eichengreen and Mody report statistically 
significant impacts of the GDP growth rate (negative), debt rescheduling (positive, 
dummy variable), a “bond supply” variable measuring the issue size (negative), 
and the issuer credit rating residual, derived from an equation where the ratings 
5 Unlike in Min (998) or Edwards (986), the Debt to GNP or Debt to GDP ratios are not found 
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are regressed against a number of fundamental and other variables (negative). 
However, this time the 0-year USTB rate turns out significantly and negatively 
correlated to bond yield spreads in all equations but Latin America, where it comes 
out positively associated with spreads but insignificant. Finally, like in Edwards 
(986) and Min (998), Eichengreen and Mody do not explicitly control for a 
measure of global risk aversion and do not take into account the breakdown of 
fundamental variables (current account, real exchange rate, inflation, etc) into 
permanent and transitory components.
In another multi-country analysis, but using a time series approach, Arora 
and Cerisola (2000) estimate the determinants of secondary market sovereign bond 
spreads for a sample of  countries, including Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, over 
994-999. Their results show that ) the short-term US interest rate (FED Funds 
rate) has a positive and significant effect on emerging market spreads, displaying 
higher elasticities for Brazil and Mexico (near to one) than Argentina; 2) increased 
market volatility –reflecting uncertainty on US monetary policy, thus a proxy for 
global risk aversion– drives higher spreads across all countries; and 3) a signifi-
cant proportion of fluctuations in emerging market bond spreads is accounted for 
country-specific fundamentals; in particular a higher net foreign asset position (in 
terms of GDP or imports), lower fiscal deficits and lower ratios of debt service to 
exports and debt service to GDP help decrease sovereign spreads. The authors omit 
the 0-year or 30-year USTB rate, do not explicit any contagion variable, and do 
not break down the variation in fundamental variables (net foreign asset position, 
fiscal deficits, debt ratios) into permanent and transitory changes.
Studying a short sample spanning June 997 to September 998, Aronovich 
(999) uses daily data to regress sovereign spreads in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
against three variables and their lagged values. These variables are the implicit 
probability of default (positive and significant), the 30-year USTB rate (positive, 
significant and displaying an overreaction), and the spread between the latter and 
the 6-month USTB rate, in order to capture the effect of the term-structure of US 
bond yields on spreads (though statistically insignificant). The author does not 
control for country-specific fundamentals, contagion episodes, and global risk 
aversion.
Baig and Goldfjan (2000) and Nogues and Grandes (200) perform 
country-specific regressions on the Brazilian and Argentinian sovereign spreads, 
respectively. Baig and Goldfjan focus on the contagion effects from the Russian 
default (August 998) on Brazilian financial markets through various channels 
including through bonds spreads. Even though they limit the sample to daily data 
in the years 997-998, they find evidence supporting the contagion hypothesis 
and report a negative impact of the long-term USTB rate on spreads. yet, they do 
not control for Brazilian fundamentals and do not explicit a measure of global risk 
aversion in their model. Nogues and Grandes (200) study the Argentinian case 
over the period 994-998 using time-series techniques and monthly observations. 
They find a negative and significant effect of the 30-year USTB yield to maturity 
on sovereign spreads, they evidence some contagion from the Mexican and Asian 
crises and report statistically significant impacts of fiscal deficits (negative), GDP the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 57
growth (negative), the debt service to exports ratio (positive), and a measure of 
political noise (positive) on sovereign default risk6. Nogues and Grandes (200) 
do not break down the variation in fundamental variables (debt ratios, real ex-
change rate, etc.) into permanent and transitory changes, and do not control for 
global risk aversion.
Ferrucci (2003) investigates the empirical relationship between emerging 
market sovereign spreads and a set of common macroeconomic fundamentals, 
using a ragged-edge panel of JP Morgan EMBI and EMBI Global secondary market 
spreads and a set of macro-prudential indicators monthly over the period December 
99-March 2003. The estimation technique posits a dynamic error correction model 
that allows short-run parameters to vary across individual groups, while restricting 
long-run elasticities to be identical across groups. Ferrucci concludes that markets 
do take into account macro fundamentals when pricing sovereign risk: the external 
debt to GDP ratio (positive), the degree of openness (negative), the ratio of amor-
tizations to reserves and current account to GDP are all significantly correlated to 
sovereign spreads, and so are, but to a less extent, the interest payments to external 
debt (positive) as well as the fraction of short-term external debt (positive, against 
expectations). However, non-fundamental factors also play an important role. In 
this regard, the regression results suggest a strong empirical relationship between 
sovereign spreads and external factors such as global liquidity conditions and US 
equity prices. More specifically, an increase in the 30-day USTB rate increases 
sovereign spreads while an increase in the 0-year USTB rate tightens them. US 
equity prices are significantly negatively correlated to emerging market spreads. 
Ferrucci controls for global risk aversion, measured by the yield spread between 
low and high-rating US corporate bonds and finds a negative impact on emerging 
market sovereign spreads, i.e. higher junk bond spreads are associated with lower 
emerging market spreads. It is worth noting, again, that macroeconomic fundamen-
tals are not split up into permanent and transitory components.
Gonzalez Rozada and Levy-yeyati (2006) study the extent to which changes 
in interest rates and bond spreads in developed countries explain the variability of 
emerging market spreads in recent years (993-2005). More precisely, based on 
high frequency (daily, weekly and monthly) data, they estimate panel error-correc-
tion models of emerging country spreads on high-yield spreads and international 
rates (0-year UST yield to maturity), controlling for country-specific variability 
(using credit ratings as a proxy for country-specific risk or, alternatively, country-
month dummies) as well as for the presence of contagion through the Mexican and 
6 other related studies on Latin American sovereign spreads are Wong (2000) and Jostova (2006). 
Wong draws on the APT theory and runs a pooled data regression using bond quarterly data from early 
994 to early 999. Although he provides interesting insights into the determinants of Latin American 
country risk, specially with regards to contagion, his dependent variable is the spreads ARCH () 
volatility. Therefore, his results are not comparable to those found in the literature we survey. on the 
other hand, Jostova (2006) studies emerging market sovereign spreads in an econometric framework 
allowing for short and long run dynamics, yet she focuses on the predictability of these spreads than 
on the explanatory power of fundamentals or other external factors. Neither Jostova (2006) nor Wong 
(2000) decomposes the relevant fundamentals into permanent and transitory components.58 cuAdernos de econoMíA Vol. 44 (Noviembre) 2007
Russian financial crises. The authors show that a large fraction of the variability 
of emerging market bond spreads is explained by the evolution of global factors 
such as risk appetite (as reflected in the spread of high yield corporate bonds in 
developed markets, positive and significant), global liquidity (measured by the 
0-year UST rate, positive and significant) and contagion (from systemic events 
like the Russian default or the Mexican currency and banking crises, (positive and 
mostly significant). The credit rating also comes out significant and negatively 
correlated to spreads (a rating upgrade compresses sovereign spreads). The link 
between emerging country spreads and global factors is shown to remain rela-
tively stable over the history of the emerging market class since 993, is robust 
to the inclusion of country-specific factors, asymmetries, alternative risk appetite 
indicators or adjusted ratings, and helps provide accurate long-run predictions. 
overall, the results highlight the critical role played by exogenous factors in the 
evolution of the borrowing cost faced by emerging economies. This confirms the 
findings in Garcia Herrero and ortiz (2005) who study the influence of global 
risk aversion on Latin American sovereign spreads.
Drawing from a database of emerging-market credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads, Remolona et al. (2007) look into the components of sovereign spreads, 
namely the expected loss from default (or sovereign default risk) and the sovereign 
risk premia. Their main finding is that risk premia account for the larger part of 
sovereign credit spreads (from two thirds to four fifths of the spread depending 
on whether the measure of expected loss is computed on the basis of corporate 
or sovereign defaults, respectively). In turn, they estimate the determinants of 
sovereign default risk using an specific measure of the expected loss as a proxy for 
sovereign default risk: the rating-implied probablity of default (RIPD). Gathering 
data for 23 emerging countries, they employ a panel regression framework with 
fixed effects, using annual data from 990 to 2005. They regress the natural loga-
rithm of RIPD for country i in year t against a vector comprising country-specific 
fundamentals as well as measures of debt intolerance, original sin and currency 
mismatch created using the international securities statistics of the BIS (200) 
and building on Borio and Packer (2004). Remolona et al. (2007) find statistically 
significant coefficients on country size (nominal GDP, positive), inflation (positive), 
economic development (GDP per capita, negative), the ratio of current account 
deficit to GDP (positive), and external debt to GDP (positive, but less significant). 
These results are robust to debt intolerance, original sin and currency mismatch. 
Global risk aversion and contagion are not controlled for in this regression7 as the 
authors are only explaining the variability in the expected loss from default, i.e. 
pure sovereign default risk. However, there is no indication of any breakdown of 
the fundamentals into permanent and transitory components.
7 In another set of econometric models they regress credit default swap spreads against proxies for 
sovereign default risk (RIPD, average agency ratings and Institutional Investor rankings, respectively), 
and control for global risk aversion (VIx, positive  and significant) and liquidity (bonds outstanding, 
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There are at least three related strands of the literature, which are not sur-
veyed here. The first is on the determinants and dynamics of other measures of 
sovereign creditworthiness, namely “distance to default”, sovereign credit ratings, 
probabilities of default (including debt rescheduling, debt moratorium and debt 
restructuring) and institutional investors credit risk rankings8. For a late survey 
of this literature see Rowland and Torres (2004) or Diaz Weigel and Gemmill 
(2006)9. The second strand studies the relationship between sovereign spreads 
and currency risk, its dynamics (Domowitz et al., 998) and policy implications 
for the optimal exchange rate regime debate (Ahumada and Garegnani, 2005; 
Powell and Sturzenneger, 2000; Borensztein et al., 200). The third strand of the 
related literature tests whether monetary and exchange rate policies in emerging 
countries are independent, or put differently whether emerging-market interest 
rates and spreads are sensitive to US interest rates at both spectrums of the yield 
curve (Frankel, 999; Frankel et al., 2000; Kamin and von Kleist, 999).
3.  the Model
In this section we present the theoretical framework upon which the sub-
sequent empirical analysis is grounded. The model is based on, and adapted from 
Kharas (984). It is a model with real variables, where a small open economy 
produces Y units of output using an AK-type production function (assumes 
labor is non-binding factor, i.e. there is an excess supply of labor in this stylized 
economy):
()  Y bK =
Hence, the law of motion of physical output can be written as:
(2)    Y bK =
8 See for instance Cantor and Packer (996), Kiguel and Lopetegui (997), Haque, Mark and 
Mathieson (998), Reisen and von Maltzan (999) or Borio and Packer (2004). Also see Remolona 
et al. (2007).
9 This paper uses bond prices to investigate how the creditworthiness of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
and Venezuela is influenced by global, regional and country-specific factors. From the bond prices, 
each country’s distance-to-default is estimated monthly for 994 to 200. Country-specific variables 
account for only about 8% of the explained variance; the largest part of the variance (45%) is explained 
by regional factors, which relate to joint stock-market returns, volatility and market sentiment; global 
conditions, related mainly to US stock-market returns, explain another 25% of the variance. of the 
20% variance which remains unexplained, more than half is due to another common (but unidentified) 
factor. Diaz Weigel and Gemmill conclude that the creditworthiness of these four emerging markets 
is mainly driven by a common set of factors, which are related closely to stock-markets in the region 
and the United States.60 cuAdernos de econoMíA Vol. 44 (Noviembre) 2007
New investment occurs so long as capital is built up. This depends on 
domestic resources, external gross capital inflows and a constant or autonomous 
term. In other words:
(3)   K a K a F r D a = + − + + 1 2 3 ( ( ) ) θ
where: D is the outstanding external debt; F is the gross level of capital inflows 
(new borrowings to finance balance of payments disequilibria); r stands for the 
interest rate on each of all borrowings (or coupon bond rate); and θ is the constant 
rate of amortization of this debt. The higher θ, the shorter the maturity.
The parameter a comprises the domestic propensity to save out of na-
tional income and the technology coefficient of the production function, net of 
depreciation; a2 is the net foreign borrowing propensity (higher (lower) than one 
implies a crowd-in (crowd-out) effect between foreign borrowing and domestic 
investment)0; a3, is the autonomous component of investment. Note that a > 0, 
a2 > 0, a3 > 0, and θ > 0.
The debt stock changes over time according to:
(4)   D F D = −θ
Assume the government’s objective is to chose some foreign inflows F to 
maximize national income or consumption at any time t subject to equations (3) 
and (4). Then, it can be shown that for borrowing to occur we need a > r (see 
Kharas, 984). optimally, foreign borrowings should grow at an exogenous rate 
f lower than the interest rate r, for the intertemporal budget constraint be met. At 
some point in time the country should turn into a net funds supplier (otherwise 
we would observe higher new borrowings than repayments, i.e. a Ponzi game). 
The optimal net supply of funds can be characterized as follows:
(5)  F F F e
ft = =
*
0   with f < r
Now, we want to find the optimal time paths of D and K. This means solving 
for equations (3), (4) and (5) or a non-homogeneous, linear system of differential 
equations, being K and D the state variables, and given the initial conditions K0 
and D0. For the sake of simplicity, like in Kharas (984) let a special case be 
f = 0, that is F = F0. As long as the growth rate of net borrowings f is lower than 
0 Developing and emerging countries tend to be predominantly concerned with cash-flow consider-
ations due to the nature of the budgetary process, and so make decisions on the basis of the available 
resources represented by ( ( ) ) F r D − +θ . This would also be the case for private borrowers faced with 
credit rationing in capital markets.the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 6
the real yield or coupon bond rate r, the assumption of f = 0 can be safely held 
without any theoretical implication for the stationary state solution to the system 
of differential equations. only the complementary solution of this system would 
change as there would be an additional non-linear term F e
ft
0  to solve for, thus the 
axes would be rescaled at a continuous rate f. yet the eigenvalues and eigenvectors 
would stay equal and so would the dynamics of D and K determined by a critical 





K a K a F r D a
= −






 2 0 3
θ
θ ( ( ) )
The eigenvalues and eigenvectors are, respectively:
  λ λ θ   2  2 2  0 = = − = = a V V a ( , ) ( (r r a + + θ θ ), ) 
Both characteristic roots are real and display opposite signs. The system must be 
characterized by a saddle point. In the stationary state, no new investment and 
debt variation should take place. Thus:





















 is constant and coincides with V, or the eigenvector associated with D. 
Now, solving equations (3) and (4) more generally we are able to come up with 
V2 or Kc, a minimum capital stock (henceforth critical capital stock or Kc) to sup-
port a given borrowing program. A country able and willing to undertake higher 
borrowing will be able to service its debt at a lower level of income (and capital) 
than one with low capital inflows. Conversely, high debt service can be sustained 



























Then, putting V and V2 (Kc) together in a phase diagram (Figure 2) we 
can ascertain the dynamics of (D, K).62 cuAdernos de econoMíA Vol. 44 (Noviembre) 2007
Kc represents the unstable branch of the phase diagram and hence the break-
even point between the “good or creditworthy” and “bad and not creditworthy” 
regions. Above (below) V2 the capital stock will be rising (decreasing), while to 
the left (right) of V1 debt stocks will be growing (declining). Above V2 indeed the 
product from domestic capital (or income) will be more than sufficient to meet 
debt service obligations, consumption plans and capital depreciation allowances 
(“good region”). As it is more likely debt stocks grow in developing countries, 
the question boils down to whether the economy will be one along paths like aa 
where capital stock grows faster than debt (lower debt to capital ratios) or on the 
contrary will fall onto a path like bb where capital stock grows faster than debt at 
the beginning, then slows down and grows slower than debt, leading to deteriorated 
ratios of capital to debt. The answer relies on the parameter values r, θ, ai and F0. 
They determine whether aa or bb will be more likely. The higher Kc relative to 
the actual K, the higher the exposure of the economy (the larger the bad region) 
and the more likely the economy is on an unsustainable path.
Given the division of long-run paths into those that are creditworthy and 
those that are not, we may accordingly associate a theory of sovereign risk with 
the likelihood of being shocked from one region to another. This is done precisely 
by calculating Kc, which is sufficient to maintain creditworthiness at any level 
of expected gross capital inflows and outstanding debt. We argue that a higher 
critical capital stock relative to the actual capital stock will imply a more nega-
tive assessment of the economy’s ability to repay the debt, i.e. paths like bb will 
 Interestingly, an economy along bb might raise questions about which policies could make the 






















( ) θthe deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 63
be more likely, thus higher sovereign risk2. Here comes in the first difference 
of our model with Kharas’: instead of a theory of rescheduling we put forward a 
theory of continuous sovereign risk associated with the distance of Kc from the 
actual K with respect to a given threshold. This relative distance should be continu-
ously reflected in market expectations. More specifically, the secondary market 
sovereign spread r should be a positive function of the distance of Kc from the 
actual K with respect to a given threshold say C. At the time Kharas published 
his article in 984, the emerging secondary bond market was virtually inexistent. 
By contrast, it was banking loans what made up the main source of finance for 
developing countries.
So, instead of a probability of rescheduling outstanding loans (as pro-
posed by Kharas, 984), think of investors continuously evaluating the degree 
of creditworthiness of any particular country by examining at every point in time 
the country’s representative secondary bond market spread r, a consistent indica-
tor of sovereign risk3. If Kc rises above its actual value, then there would be a 
general loss of investor confidence in the long run ability of the country to service 
its debt, therefore lower foreign borrowing, lower investment and higher r. In 
addition, assume, in a more or less ad-hoc fashion, that the degree of creditwor-
thiness reflected through r is not only set deterministically but also has a random 
determinant which we can define as  µt. This randomness may be on account of 
potentially omitted variables, e.g. sociopolitical variables, contagion, global risk 
aversion (risk premia) or unexpected short-term fluctuations in the parameters 
(marginal propensity to save, technology, shocks, terms of trade, etc)4. In short, 
our theory posits:





































































2 As Kharas argues, a critique to the use of static debt to GDP ratios (see for instance Solomon, 
977) and Feder and Just (977) is in order. This ratio proves to be misleading when compared across 
countries at a moment of time; its dynamics appears as more important. 
3 The probability of rescheduling, and more generally the probability of default is an inverse, non-linear 
function of sovereign bond spreads, under no-arbitrage opportunities and risk-neutral investors.
4 In Kharas (984), the random term explains the deviations of the forecast critical capital stock 
from its threshold value, thus a variation in the probability of rescheduling a loan due to uncertain-
ties unrelated to the long-term fundamentals but to short-term fluctuations in parameters or in other 
omitted variables.64 cuAdernos de econoMíA Vol. 44 (Noviembre) 2007
As capital stocks are only observable in low frequency data, and recalling 
equation (), we can use the real output or GDP as a proxy variable for capital 
stocks. Rearranging terms and replacing F by the current account deficit CA –in 





































Where DS stands for external debt service (interest payments plus amor-
tization). This expression yields a testable equation:













































A crucial point before proceeding to the econometric estimation is to dis-
tinguish between permanent and transitory changes in the explanatory variables 
on the right-hand side of equation (4). This is another difference with Kharas 
(984) and more generally with the empirical literature reviewed in section 2. 
We propose a modified version of equation (4) as follows, where perm stands 
5 It is beyond the scope of this paper to test the discipline imposed on each of the coefficients β . See 
Kharas (984) to find out how the parameters implied in the calculation of each β can be backed out 
from the econometric estimates, however from a different perspective and using a different econo-
metric methodology.
Box 
BoND yIELDS AND CoUPoNS. AN ILLUSTRATIoN
While R is the interest rate of each borrowing (coupon rate), it is not necessarily 
equal to the implicit bond yield or secondary market spread. For a two-period, 
fixed-coupon rate bond, paying out R over the principal B0, its present value (PV) 
can be easily calculated as:
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Where y represents the risky bond yield, broken down into a risk-free rate and 
sovereign default premium. If R is assumed fixed, it will not depend on y at any 
T. However, new bonds issuances may take into account the fact y –for a similar 
residual maturity– is high or low, hence reflecting a relationship between both.the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 65
for the permanent value of each variable and trans for its transitory change from 
the permanent value.
(5) 
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Intuitively, if GDP experiences a permanent increase, that should reduce the 
critical capital stock required to finance a given borrowing program in all periods. 
As a result, the creditworthiness of the economy should strongly improve (lower 
sovereign spreads), while it should not necessarily improve when that increase 
is transitory. We would expect an ambiguous effect on spreads from a permanent 
change in gross capital inflows or in the current account deficit. If these flows 
are mostly addressed to tradable sectors, and take the form of direct investment 
or equity participation in productive projects, the future repayment capacity of 
the country will be enhanced durably, thus decreasing sovereign risk. By contrast, 
the more these flows are invested in non-tradables, the more short-term or more 
volatile they are (typically bond flows), and the higher spreads will be. Finally, a 
permanent reduction in the share of domestic resources needed to service external 
obligations should also narrow sovereign spreads because the critical capital stock 
would be lower, and so would the degree of exposure of the economy. Transitory 
changes in GDP, CA/GDP or DS/GDP should have no impact, or a very small 
one if any, on sovereign bond spreads.
Therefore, we would expect:
 
β β β β β β  2 3 2 22 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 > > ≥ ≥ ; ; ; ; ≷ ≷ and
Finally, in order to make explicit the randomness  µt in equation (5), we 
include a number of variables intended to capture financial contagion effects across 
countries, risk premia (global risk aversion or market sentiment), and changes in 
US long and short-term bond yield (that is, the FED funds rate and the 30-year 
US Treasury bond yield).
4.  dAtA set And eMPiricAl fActs
4.  Data sources and frequency
Table 3 summarizes the sources of data and measurement of the dependent 
variable and its determinants. The index EMBI+ sovereign spread is deflated using 
the consumer price index of each country.66 cuAdernos de econoMíA Vol. 44 (Noviembre) 2007
We extract the permanent component of each determinant by smoothing 
the original series through the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter6. We label the filtered 
series with the tag HP (e.g. GDP_HP_AR stand for the Hodrick-Prescott filtered 
series of GDP in Argentina). The cyclical variations of each fundamental are 
computed as the percentage deviation of the actual value of each variable from 
its Hodrick-Prescott trend. We label the cyclical series with the tag CyC (e.g. 
GDP_CyC_AR stand for the cyclical component of GDP in Argentina).
Most of the raw data is monthly. When only quarterly data is available, 
we convert the corresponding series to monthly frequency through an algorithm 
provided by EVIEWS (a cubic spline). Global risk aversion (risk premia) and 
“financial contagion” are measured by the Real BB Merrill Lynch high yield 
index (HyUS) and three dummy variables (TEqUILA, RUSSIA and BRAZIL), 
respectively. We control for changes in US real interest rates using the FED funds 
6 We leave for future research a sensitivity analysis of the variables decomposition into permanent 
and fundamental components through the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
TABLE 2



















































Abbreviations: EMBI: Emerging Market Bond Index; IFS: International Financial Statistics (IMF); 
MECoN: Ministerio de Economía; BCB: Banco Central do Brasil; Banxico: Banco de México; SHCP: 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público; INEGI: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Geografía e 
Información.
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rate (FEDRATE) and the 30-year bond yield real index (UST30). Nominal rates 
are deflated employing the US consumer price index.
The expected sign for each control variable is:
Real FED Funds Rate (+): this variable measures the impact of the US monetary 
policy on sovereign bond yield spreads. on the real side of the economy, a tight-
ening in US monetary policy can push spreads up if, other things equal, higher 
interest rates imply a decline in expected domestic investment and consumption, 
or reduce the country’s export following an slowdown in the US. on the financial 
side, higher real FED Funds rates can increase the cost of bond capital in emerging 
countries and eventually cut off their access to capital markets. As a consequence, 
a higher spreads would be requested to compensate investors for the larger risk of 
holding emerging market bonds.
Real US Treasury bond 30 years yield (+/–): this variable tests two potential ef-
fects on sovereign spreads: a) portfolio substitution (+), and b) flight to quality 
(–). Through a substitution effect, it is expected that increases in the 30-year UST 
real bond yield make the investment in these bonds more attractive, so that the 
supply of loanable funds for emerging countries would diminish (less demand for 
emerging sovereign bonds) and, as a result, the sovereign spread would increase. 
on the other hand, in periods of financial crises or market turmoil –which is a 
frequent observation over the period under analysis– the flight-to-quality effect 
seems to prevail. As global investors flee to quality, that is when for some reason 
they massively raise their holdings of long-term US Treasury bonds bonds to the 
detriment of emerging bonds, they drive US Treasury bond prices up and yields 
down on one side, and increase emerging-market sovereign spreads on the other. 
Hence, the expected sign is ambiguous.
Global risk aversion (+/–): this variable captures the impact on sovereign spreads 
of an increase in global risk aversion or the risk premia associated with unexpected 
losses from defaults in risky bond markets. We use BB US corporate bond yields 
deflated by US consumer prices as a proxy for risk aversion. The pricing of these 
bonds, also known as “junk bonds”, reflect pretty well how global investors at-
titudes towards risk (“market sentiment”) change and influence their “sister” asset 
class, emerging-market bonds specially those in the speculative grade category. 
The effect of a variation in global risk aversion on emerging sovereign spreads is 
ambiguous depending on whether the two asset classes are viewed as complements 
(positive) or substitutes (negative).68 cuAdernos de econoMíA Vol. 44 (Noviembre) 2007
4.2  Empirical facts
We now turn the attention to the facts behind each of these determinants. 
Understanding the underlying trends and cycles regarding each variable allow us 
to grasp what the effects on the critical capital stock ratio (theoretical model) and 
subsequently on the sovereign risk premia could be. Figures 3 display monthly 
figures for each of those variables.
First, as already said, a higher permanent real GDP growth (steeper slope 
of GDP levels) implies higher domestic savings and investment, hence a lower 
critical capital stock ratio to meet a given borrowing program. This should be 
reflected through lower spreads. Figure 3-a shows that Mexico and Brazil in that 
order outperform Argentina’s permanent GDP growth over 993-200. This hints 
that Argentina should bear higher spreads than Mexico and to a less extent Brazil. 
Moreover, the impressive record of long-term growth in the case of Mexico after 
995 may well explain why it has been able to issue bonds at less than 200 basis 
points and has been awarded the investment grade status by all major rating agen-
cies since early 2000.
Second, higher permanent gross capital inflows (or current account deficits) 
should also reduce the degree of exposure of the economy (lower critical capital 
stock ratio), thus bringing spreads down provided those inflows contribute favor-
ably to bolster the country’s export capacity, i.e. if foreign direct investment (FDI) 
addressed to tradable sectors or other long-term flows alike are a large fraction of 
total gross capital inflows. Although we cannot see in Figure 3-b which type of 
capital inflows have prevailed over 993-200, recent empirical work documented 
in Grandes and Reisen (2003) has shown that Argentina attracted more portfolio 
flows in that period, in particular debt and capital flows oriented to non-tradables 
while Mexico received a higher share of FDI towards tradable sectors. As to 
Brazil, FDI flows have increased in absolute and relative terms since the real 
was devalued and subsequently floated in 999. In Figure 3-b we observe that 
after 998 Brazil and Mexico have posted stable and less volatile current account 
deficits than Argentina.
Third, heavier permanent ratios of debt service to GDP influence negatively 
sovereign risk because more domestic resources are required to meet the outstand-
ing debt and thereby, all else equal, less resources are available for real consumption 
and investment. Figure 3-c is very telling indeed. Argentina has experienced a 
permanent increase in debt service requirements in terms of GDP from 0.2% in 
994 to more than 0.8% in 200 (with hindsight we know that Argentina defaulted 
in early 2002); Mexico has sharply curbed the debt burden after its own financial 
crisis occurred in 994-995, bringing the permanent debt service to GDP from 
more than % at the end of 995 to less than 0.8% in 200, yet with a growing 
GDP. Brazil also exhibits an upward permanent change in debt service to GDP 
which slows down since 2000, yet at much higher levels.the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 69
5.  econoMetric frAMework And results
5.  Framework
The functional form adopted in our econometric model is directly derived 
from the solution to the system of differential equations set out in section 3, the 
definition of creditworthiness and the introduction of permanent and transitory 
changes in the fundamental variables (see equation 5). There is no need to assume 
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FIGURE 3
MACRoECoNoMIC FUNDAMENTALS (SoLID LINE)
AND HP FILTERED SERIES (DoTTED LINE)
Figure 3-a: Real GDP or global/industrial production indexes
  Argentina  Brazil  Mexico
Figure 3-b: Current Account to GDP ratios:
  Argentina  Brazil  Mexico
Figure 3-c: Debt Service to GDP ratios
  Argentina  Brazil  Mexico
Source: author’s elaboration.70 cuAdernos de econoMíA Vol. 44 (Noviembre) 2007
In order to operationalize each country equation –as shown in equation 
(5)– we depart from a general autoregressive distributed lag model of order (p,q) 
–ARDL (p,q)–, displayed through equation (6). This specification allows the 
interaction between short-run dynamics and long-run variable levels.
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Where Yt is the real secondary market spread at each t, and Xj is the explana-
tory variable set, namely the inverse of real GDP, the current account balance to 
GDP and the ratio of debt service to GDP; including both their permanent and 
transitory components. After some manipulations equation (6) can be rewritten 
as7:
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. The term in brackets on the right-hand side
of equation (7) captures the “steady state” (or “long-run”) version of equation (6). 
Thus, the long-run impact of explanatory variable j on Y is equal to −( ) β a j .
For an ARDL(3,3) model with one explanatory variable X (i.e. k = ), 
equation (7) would look as follows:
(8) 
D D D D D D Y b X B X B X A Y A Y t t t t t t = − − − − − − − − 0   2 2   2 2 2
    + + + ( )+ − − c Y X u t t t a β ,
where B b b  2 3 = +  and B b 2 3 = ; A a a  2 3 = +  and A a 2 3 = ; a = + + − a a a  2 3  
and  β 0  2 3 = + + + b b b b . The long-run impact of X on Y is thus equal to 
−( )= β a   − + + + ( ) + + − ( ) b b b b a a a 0  2 3  2 3  .
Whenever possible, we use the maximum sample size of 08 observa-
tions in each regression (993-200). However, because of missing observations 
for some explanatory variables or because we deliberately omit extremes values 
in the sample the estimation period may be shortened. This is the case in Brazil 
from January 993 to June 994, a period of very high inflation preceding the 
7 These manipulations imply: ) subtracting yt- on each hand side, 2) adding and subtracting ai yt-i+ 
on the right hand side, as many times as optimal lags are included by the model; and 3) adding and 
subtracting bjxt-j as many times as optimal lags are retained by the best specification of the model.the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 7
Real Plan where real spreads are at levels above two or more standard deviations 
from the mean and generally above 2000 basis points; and Argentina from July 
to December 200, when real sovereign spreads fluctuate above one or more 
standard deviations from the mean and almost always over 2000 basis points on 
the eve of default8.
Before we move on to the estimations of equation (7), a note on the integra-
tion order of the explanatory variables is in order. As we can see the in Appendix, 
Table A, the integration order of the variables, or the nature of the stochastic pro-
cesses they follow, should not pose a problem to our econometric model. Almost 
all variables included in our regressions are stationary processes or near unit roots 
so the estimations should not yield spurious results. We conduct the Phillips-Perron 
unit-root test. When the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected at 
5% or 0% of significance (UST30, FEDRATE, EMBIEoMREAL_MEx, see 
Appendix) we carry out a consistency proof by checking whether they are station-
ary in some sub-periods. For instance, the FED Funds real interest rate is stationary 
in 995:0-2000:2 but it is not over the whole period (993:0 200:2). In any 
event, the results of Phillips-Perrons’ test should be interpreted cautiously. The ex-
planatory power of unit root test is limited and its results are sensitive to the sample 
size and volatility.
In order to estimate equation (7) for each country, we proceed as follows:
st stage: we estimate oLS country-specific equations and assess their output 
through a battery of conventional tests (see Appendix, Table 3A).
2nd stage: we compare oLS to a second estimator, namely the System Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressor (SUR-SyS). As common shocks not accounted for by our 
model may cause high correlation across the residuals –what is not unusual in 
time series of financial returns of a similar asset class– we quantify the magnitude 
of this correlation. The SUR-SyS estimated through Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) usually yield more consistent and efficient estimators than oLS 
and help reduce the contemporaneous cross residual correlation.
3rd stage: we offer an economic intuition for the results and discuss their 
robustness.
5.2  Regression results
Table 3 presents the estimation results. overall, the oLS estimates display 
satisfactory results and pass the standard tests of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality and inexistence of structural breaks (Appendix, Table A2 and A3). The 
permanent components of the explanatory variables are highly significant or have 
8 Mexico’s sample is constrained by the availability of debt service data up to the third quarter of 
2000.72 cuAdernos de econoMíA Vol. 44 (Noviembre) 2007
a greater impact than the transitory shocks when the latter come out statistically 
significant. The three financial contagion dummies are very significant. However, 
the other controls, our proxy for global risk aversion and the US real interest rates 
are less or not statistically significant.
The relatively high oLS contemporaneous residual cross correlations, as 
shown in Table 4, suggest that we can achieve efficiency gains by using SUR-SyS 
estimators. That is, despite passing all standard tests, the properties of the oLS 
estimator can still be improved. SUR estimators are unbiased in small samples; 
TABLE 3
EMPIRICAL DETERMINANTS oF THE SoVEREIGN RISK PREMIUM




















C 7828.68*** 9058.20*** 6645.83*** 938.52*** –366.95** 976.0
Lagged Dep. Var. –0.27*** –0.3*** –0.5*** –0.60*** –0.33*** –0.28***
Cyclical 
  GDP_CyC(–) –20.63 5.52 –430.58 93.08 –925.23*** –50.45***
  CAGDP_CyC(–) –37.33 –23.76 87.7*** 3.56 –5.37 –3.38
  DSGDP_CyC(–) –89.87 –7. –67.66 20.84 –46.34 –64.74*
Trend
  GDP_HP(–) –82.39*** –96.67*** –46.5*** –58.43*** 5.69 –6.68*
  CAGDP_HP(–) –336630.8*** –4046.7*** 74.3*** 22479.34*** –404599.5** –5350.49
  DSGDP_HP(–) 5027.48** 5772.6*** 003.98*** 9239.38*** 240938.4** –32086.8
Global risk aversion and controls
  UST30 –7.95 –5.7 –85.73*** –22.52*** 8.26 8.0
  FED_RATE 2.2 5.26 –38.22*** –72.2** 43.0*** 33.96***
  HyUS –80.33*** –8.00*** –3.2 –8.00*** 2.64 –8***
Financial Contagion
  TEqUILA 390.7*** 382.79*** 63.40*** 339.33** 398.22*** 370.49***
  RUSSIA 865.44*** 843.67*** 22.45*** 605.07*** 243.05*** 245.54***
  BRAZIL 27.04** 20.97*** 47.7** 84.93 74.08 73.80
Note: ***, **, *  the coefficients are statistically significant at the %, 5% or 0% respectively. For 
reasons of space, and in order to allow a straightforward comparison across equations, we omit other 
significant control variables (lagged values of the dependent variable and lagged differences of the 
explanatory variables). 
Source: author’s elaboration. the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 73
they are consistent, normally distributed and asymptotically efficient so long as 
the FGLS residuals are normally distributed too9.
SUR-SyS yields highly significant coefficients on the permanent compo-
nents of fundamentals. These estimates are generally more statistically significant 
and robust than the cyclical variations of those fundamentals, with some exception 
in the case of Mexico. SUR-SyS produce, in most cases, more consistent estima-
tors (lower variances, higher statistical significance) than oLS’. This fact is also 
reflected in the residual cross correlation matrix, which now displays substantially 
lower correlations with the exception of that between Argentina and Mexico which 
decreases just by 0.05 (Table 5) 20. For these reasons we will adopt the SUR-SyS 
estimates as our best econometric output.
5.3  Economic interpretation
As we obtain the best econometric output using SUR-SyS-FGLS, we only 
comment on the point estimates obtained through this estimation procedure. It is 
9 See Greene (2000) or the seminal contribution of Zellner (962).
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Argentina .00 0.27 0.58
Brazil 0.27 .00 0.6






Argentina .00 0.27 0.58
Brazil 0.50 .00 0.52
Mexico 0.63 0.52 .00
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important for the reader to recall that our estimated coefficients –βj in (4)– sum-
marize the term impact of the explanatory variables on the sovereign spreads 
dynamics (first difference of EMBIEoMREAL). In addition, we can compute the 
long-term impact of the explanatory variables −( ) β a j  on the level of sovereign 
spreads (see Table 6).
TABLE 6
LoNG-TERM IMPACT oF FUNDAMENTAL VARIABLES 
oN SoVEREIGN SPREADS
Country/Variable Coefficient Argentina Brazil Mexico
Lagged Dep. Var. a –0.3* –0.60* –0.28*
CAGDP_CyC β –23.76 3.56 –3.38
long run impact  –(βj /a) na na na
CAGDP_HP β –4046.7* 22479.34* –5350.49
long run impact  –(βj /a) –324070.00 7254.00 na
DSGDP_CyC β –7. 20.84 –64.74
long run impact  –(βj /a) na na na
DSGDP_HP β 5772.6* 9239.38* –32086.8
long run impact  –(βj /a) 8668.30 29804.50 na
GDP_CyC β 5.52 93.08 –50.45*
long run impact  –(βj /a) na na –4872.40
GDP_HP β –96.67* –58.43* –6.68
long run impact  –(βj /a) –3.84 –88.48 na
Note: *, The coefficient is statistically significant at % or 5%.
Source: author’s elaboration.the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 75
The estimated coefficients βj cannot be read as elasticities. Because 
our dependent variable is expressed as a first difference of the spread, 
D(EMBIEoMREAL), the point estimates should be read as the impact of an ab-
solute change in the long-run level of the explanatory variable (or in the controls) 
on the slope of the spread function. For example, a 0.0 reduction in the permanent 
level of debt service to GDP ratio (i.e. % less of GDP devoted to debt servicing) 
brings down the variation in spreads by 577 and 92 basis points in Argentina and 
Brazil, respectively. This means a slowdown in the rate at which spreads are rising 
or a further decline in the rate at which they are falling. In the long run, the impact 
of a similar reduction (the debt service to GDP ratio decreases by 0.0) is 86 
and 298 basis points in Argentina and Brazil, respectively. The heavy debt burden 
observed in these countries might partly explain the relatively high real interest rates 
and spreads, thus a correspondingly high degree of exposure of their economies. 
For Mexico, the βj associated with debt service to GDP is not significant.
As to the current account deficit (or gross capital inflows) over GDP, its 
permanent component is very significant in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, 
but not in the Mexican equation. Here, a 0.00 reduction in the permanent level 
of gross capital inflows to GDP ratios (i.e. 0.% less in available foreign supply 
of funds in GDP terms) increases the variation in spreads by 40 basis points in 
Argentina while it narrows it by about 22 basis points in the Brazilian equation. 
The corresponding long-term impacts are 324 and 72 basis points. This fact 
might indicate Brazil’s inflows have progressively been more oriented towards the 
tradable sector and have been of a longer maturity whereas those flows directed 
to Argentina have been of the opposite nature. The cyclical variation of currency 
account deficits is not significant in any country equation.
The permanent component of real GDP is highly significant in all equa-
tions, but to a less extent in Mexico. They all carry the expected negative sign (β 
in the theoretical model was expected to be positive because the original variable 
associated to it was the inverse of real GDP). As the proxy variables for real GDP 
are expressed in indexes holding a base-year value of 00, we can infer that a  
point increase in the permanent component of real GDP will diminish the rate of 
variation in spreads by 96, 58 and 6 basis points in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, 
respectively, yet the impact is only significant at 0% for Mexico. In spite of this, 
we observe that the point estimate corresponding to its cyclical component is 
statistically significant at %, contrary to our expectations. Here, a one percent 
increase in the actual output respect to its permanent component brings down the 
spread variation by 5 basis points. Conversely, the long-term impact of  point 
increase in the permanent component of real GDP is 32 and 88 basis points in 
Argentina and Brazil, respectively.
We impose and successfully test a cross linear restriction that the US real 
yields on BB corporate bonds should have a similar impact on all markets. Indeed, 
 absolute point (00 basis points) increase in the global risk aversion decrease 
sovereign spreads by 8 basis points across the border. This confirms that junk 
bonds and Latin American bonds were seen as substitutes assets over the period 
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The contagion dummy variables suggest, on one side, a stronger contagion 
from the Russian crisis in Argentina and Brazil, and on the other it shows no 
statistically significant impact of the Brazilian devaluation on Mexico’s spreads, 
but a relevant effect on Argentina’s sovereign risk. Conversely, the Mexican crisis 
widens all spreads by quite close magnitudes –what seems reasonable at a time 
where little discrimination was made across emerging markets. In sum, we observe 
a stronger and more significant effect from financial crisis on spreads in emerging 
countries on Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in that order.
Finally, we report mixed results regarding the impact of US real interest 
rates on Latin American spreads. While the FED rate has no statistically significant 
effect on the Argentinian spreads, it does have, by contrast, significant and opposite 
effects on Brazil and Mexico’s. In other words, according to our estimates 00 
basis points increase in the FED Funds rate brings down the rate of variation in 
spreads in Brazil, but pushes it up Mexico, by 72 and 34 basis points, respectively. 
As the business cycle in Mexico is highly synchronized with US monetary policy 
that result comes as no surprise. on the other hand, the 30 year US Treasury bond 
real yield only has a significant and negative impact on Brazil’s equation. A 00 
basis points increase in this yield narrows the first difference of spreads initially 
by 22 basis points.
Some clarifications can be useful at this point. It is worth noting that the 
FED Funds and 30-years US Treasury bond rates have been very modestly corre-
lated over the period under study. Their linear correlation coefficient equals –0.05 
over 993:0 200:2 so collinearity problems may be disregarded2. However, 
the non-significance of this variables in the Argentinian and Mexican equations, 
respectively, might be due to some linear correlation with our risk aversion variable 
(0.5 and –0.32, respectively).
6.  concluding reMArks
This paper aimed to answer the following questions: What are the theoretical 
and empirical determinants of sovereign bond spreads? More specifically, which 
variables have influenced sovereign bond spreads in Latin American countries? 
How statistically and economically important are fundamentals as opposed to 
contagion effects, global risk aversion or international risk-free interest rates? 
How relevant is a permanent variation against a transitory change in those 
fundamentals?
In order to address these questions, we put forward a theory of sovereign 
risk based on an adjusted version of the growth-indebtedness model presented 
in Kharas (984). The special features in the adjusted model were a) the use of 
2 It is fair to mention that this correlation varies according to the reference period. For instance it 
stands at –0.27 over 993:0 998:07.the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 77
sovereign spreads instead of the probability of rescheduling a loan, b) the split 
of fundamental variables into permanent and transitory components, and c) the 
inclusion of global risk aversion and contagion variables as determinants of spreads 
Then, from the model we derived a consistent, testable linear function of sovereign 
spreads. Finally, we used dynamic econometrics to estimate the short and long 
run impacts of the explanatory variables (fundamentals, contagion, global risk 
aversion) on sovereign spreads and discussed the results.
our major finding is that changes in the permanent components of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals derived from our theoretical model explained the 
largest variation in sovereign spreads in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Financial 
contagion episodes or global risk-aversion also help account for the variability in 
sovereign risk. The effect of US real interest rates at both ends of the yield curve 
is mixed and less important overall.
The theoretical and empirical findings of this paper suggest two types of 
policy implications with a view to reducing sovereign spreads and achieve lower 
cost of capital in Latin America (but also in other emerging economies). These are: 
a) targeting the permanent components of the fundamental variables; b) bringing 
about a structural change in the estimated parameters. Regarding the first, three 
policy recommendations are in order: ) to boost output growth (i.e. export-
oriented strategies), 2) to bolster the good type of capital flows to back current 
account deficits (think of long-term, FDI flows oriented to tradable sectors), and 
3) to reduce the debt service burden in GDP terms. on the second, changes that 
affect the parameters entering each of the βj may produce a structural shift in the 
spread functions and generate more sustainable debt-capital accumulation paths 
thereby reducing spreads. This would occur if the domestic savings propensity 
augments, foreign borrowing propensity increases and capital inflows crowd-in 
local investment, and last if debt maturity lengthens.
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(Intercept, no linear trend; fixed bandwith)
Variable Estimated τ value Critical Value 5% P-Value
Argentina
D(EMBIEoMREAL) .4 –2.895 0.0000
EMBIEoMREAL* –2.53 –2.8934 0.09
CAGDP_CyC –2.68 –2.8892 0.0799
CAGDP_HP** .96 –2.8892 0.9999
DSGDP_CyC –3.88 –2.8928 0.0032
DSGDP_HP –0.04 –2.8928 0.0000
GDP_CyC (EMISA_CyC) –4.7 –2.8922 0.000
GDP_HP* (EMISA_HP)** 0.5 –2.8922 0.9864
Brazil
D(EMBIEoMREAL) –0.55 –2.8935 0.0000
EMBIEoMREAL –3.58 –2.8935 0.0080
CAGDP_CyC –3.88 –2.8892 0.0030
CAGDP_HP –7.95 –2.8892 0.0000
DSGDP_CyC –4.92 –2.8892 0.000
DSGD_PHP** .06 –2.8892 0.997
GDP_CyC (IAINDSA_CyC) –4.2 –2.8886 0.000
GDP_HP (IAINDSA2_HP) –2.43 –2.8886 0.355
Mexico
D(EMBIEoMREAL) –8.98 –2.8887 0.0000
EMBIEoMREAL –.88 –2.8886 0.340
CAGDP_CyC –2.72 –2.8892 0.0728
CAGDP_HP –4.00 –2.8889 0.0020
DSGDP_CyC –3.53 –2.8939 0.009
DSGDP_HP –3.28 –2.8939 0.086
GDP_CyC (IAGLoBSA_CyC) –2.50 –2.8922 0.80
GDP_HP (IAGLoBSA_HP) –3.27 –3.4523 0.0769the deterMinAnts of sovereign bond sPreAds 8
Variable Estimated τ value Critical Value 5% P-Value
United States
UST30 –.45 –2.8884 0.555
FEDFRATE –.2 –2.8886 0.7046
HyUS* –2.50 –2.8884 0.72
*The p-values associated with these variables are very close to the 0% significance level. There is 
no conclusive evidence pointing to the acceptance of the null of unit roots. This result is confirmed 
when performing other tests (e.g. ADF, availabe upon request).
**The p-values associated with these variables stand near  and lie in the right tail of the statistic 
distribution. This is evidence against the acceptance of the null of unit roots.
TABLE A2
PHILLIPS-PERRoN UNIT-RooT TEST FoR SUB-PERIoDS.
(Intercept, no linear trend; fixed bandwith)
Variable τ value Critical Value 5% P–Value
EMBIEoMREAL_MEx
996:0 200:2 –3.56 –2.9023 0.0088
UST30
995:0 2000:2 –2.46 –2.9023 0.298
FEDFRATE











































Note: p-values in parenthesis.
TABLE A (continued)